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THAT CARP IS NO KEEPER: COPYRIGHT
ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANELS-CHANGE
IS NEEDED, HERE IS WHY, AND HOW
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2002, the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property held an oversight hearing on the

Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) structure and process. The CARP
process has been under review for several years, and has come under heavy
criticism lately. Much of the recent criticism has focused on the Webcasting
decision of June 2002. This public criticism and congressional prodding has
prompted the United States Copyright Office to consider changes to the CARP
structure and process.'
This Note will explore the history of the current CARP, beginning with an
overview of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, the predecessor to the current
CARP. This will be followed by an overview of the current CARP structure and
an overview of a typical CARP proceeding. The Note will then explore the
Webcasting decision and the criticisms centered on this decision. The Note will
also look at the general criticisms of the current CARP process and structure,
including, but not limited to, the escalating costs of CARP proceedings, the
instability and inconsistency of CARP decisions, and the inefficiency with which
small claims are handled in the current system. The Note will then discuss
possible solutions and proposals offered by industry participants, regulators, and
legislators. Lastly, the Note will conclude with an overview of the current stage
of reform within the Copyright Office (i.e., what structure and process changes
the legislature and the Copyright Office have considered and enacted to date, and
have what the author predicts the legislature and the Copyright Office will do in
the near term).

' See, e.g., Andrew Caffrey, CopjnightOffice RtinkiangRojaies,WALL ST.J., Sept. 16,2002, at R 13
(discussing a possible structure change to CARP by the Copyright Office).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. COPYRIGHTLAW ORIGINS AND BASICS

"The Congress shall have power to... Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '
This Constitutional grant of power to Congress led to the enactment of the
first copyright statute in this country, the Copyright Statute of 1790.' Since that
original enactment, Congress has made significant changes to the copyright law

four times.4
Copyright gives the owner of "original works of authorship" protection under
the laws of the United States.' The works afforded this protection include
literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works (both
published and unpublished).' The 1976 Copyright Acte generally allows the
owner of a copyright the exclusive right to do, and to authorize others to do, the

following(1) to reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) to perform the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographed works, pantomimes and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works;

U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, ci. 8.
J Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
Congress enacted major changes to the copyright laws in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. The
1831 change added musical compositions to the list of works protected under copyright; the 1870
change added paintings, statues, and other works of fine art under the protection of copyright; the
1909 Act abandoned the list of copyrightable works and instead extended copyright protection to
all the writings of an author; and the Copyright Act of 1976 grants the protection of copyright to
original works of authorship. See Act of Feb. 3,1831, ch. 16, § 1, 14,4 Stat. 436, 436,439 (repealed
1870); Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 180, S 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909); see Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
4, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. % 101-810). See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47-49,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1582-85 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing the legislative history of copyright
statutes).
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
2

6 Id
1

17 u.s.c. SS 101-810 (2000).
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(5) to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.'

These rights are not unlimited in scope, however. For example, a major
limitation is the doctrine of "fair use." 9 Another limitation of copyright
protection is compulsory licensing, under which limited uses of copyrighted
works are permitted
upon payment of royalties and compliance with statutory
°
conditions.'
Copyright protection is not a difficult thing to achieve." To qualify, a work,
including a song," "must embody some minimal degree of originality that can be
traced to the efforts of the author."' 3 Next, the work must be "fixed" in a
sufficiently permanent environment. 4 Therefore, once a song has been created
that is somewhat original, and is reduced to some permanent form, it is protected
requirement for
under copyright law. There is no publication or registration
s
songs, although there are certain advantages to registration.
B. STATUTORY LICENSES

A statutory license is a license provided by the law (as opposed to one
voluntarily provided by the individual copyright owner). 6 In the 1909 Copyright

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
9 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Fair use exceptions are essentially a defense to a charge of copyright
infringement. The Fair Use exception is most commonly raised in educational activities, literary and
social criticism, parody, and First Amendment activities such as news reporting. ARTHUR MILLER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT, IN A NUTSHELL 354 (3d
ed. 2000). The Copyright Act explicitly identifies four interests which should be weighed in a
balancing process to determine whether a fair use exception is appropriate: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including its commercial nature; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
proportion that was used; and (4) the economic impact of the use. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
10 US Copyright Office, CopyightBasiis,availableat http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
n Richard D. Rose, Connectingthe Dots: Navigatingthe Laws andLiceningRequirements of The Interne
Music Rvoltion, 42 IDEA 313, at 320.
12 The author has used the example of a copyright for a song due to the importance of musical
copyrights in the context of Webcasting. See infraSection II.E.
13Rose, supra note 11, at 320. See alo 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
14Rose, spra note 11.
's U.S. Copyright Office, spra note 10 (noting some of the major advantages of copyright
registration: establishing a public record of the copyright claim; registration is necessary before an
infringement suit may be filed in court; registration may provide evidence of the validity of the
copyright).
16 Susan Chertkof Munsat, Statutoy Licensingfor Wrbcaster: Everything Yom Wanted to Know But
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Act, there was only one "compulsory license," that which allowed a person to
make a sound recording of a song that had been previously recorded and to
distribute copies of that recording to the public." Under the license provided by
the 1909 Act, the statutory royalty rate was $.02 per copy. This rate was set by
statute, was not subject to change, and lasted from 1909 to 1978.8 Since the rate
($.02) was set by statute, and since the user paid the copyright owner directly,
there was no need for any governmental intervention into this process (i.e. there
was no need for an agency to set a rate, or to collect and distribute royalties).'
During the drafting of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress realized that
statutorily set rates (i.e. $.02 for sound recordings) were too inflexible and did not
provide fair compensation to the copyright owner.2 Congress was also planning
to add several other statutory licenses at this time.2' Congress saw that there
would be a need for an administrative body to periodically adjust the rates of the
royalties associated with these new statutory licenses.22 Also, Congress saw the
need for a body to distribute the royalties collected from users.23 Under the
system envisioned by Congress, royalties would be deposited with the Copyright
Office and distributed according to decisions made by this new administrative
body.24
While the Senate and the House both agreed on the need for this new
administrative body, they were unsure of the most appropriate structure.2" The
Senate proposal called for a tribunal composed of a three-member panel that
would reside within the Copyright Office.26 The members of this panel would be

Wert Afraid to Ask, in PLI's MUSIC ON THE INTERNET UNDERSTANDING THE NEW RIGHTS &
SOLVING NEW PROBLEMS at 141, 149 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Handbook Series No. 640, March 2001) ("It [statutory licensing] is an efficient way to license because
it permits a webcaster [user] to perform all of the sound recordings it wishes to perform without
obtaining separate licenses from each copyright owner.").
"7 Cop)ightArbitrationRoya4 Pand(CARP)Structure andProcess:HearingBefore the HouseSubcomm.
on Courts,the Internet, and IntelkctualProp., 107th Cong. 31-32 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter CARP Heaings].
'8 Id at 32.
19 md

2 Id
21m; seegeneraly 17 U.S.C. §§ 116-9 (2000) (adding new statutory licenses in the areas of cable
retransmissions of over-the-air broadcast signals, jukebox performances of music, and the use of
published musical works and published pictorial, graphic and sculptural works by noncommercial
educational broadcasters).
2 CARP Hearings,supranote 17, at 32.
2 Id (especially important in instances "where there were many copyright owner claimants to
the same funds and there were controversies as to how much each claimant was entitled to receive").
24 I
25 Id
26

id

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss2/11

4

Maxey: That CARP Is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels - Ch

2003)

THAT CARP IS NO KEEPER

appointed by the Register of the Copyrights from the membership of the
American Arbitration Association, or a similar organization. The Register would
convene the panel in the event of a controversy over royalty rates or royalty
distributions.27
During the time the legislature was deciding the structure of this new
administrative body, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down an important decision28
regarding the appointment of persons carrying out executive branch functions.
The Supreme Court ruled that certain functions of appointed officials were
executive in nature, and should be appointed by the president. 9 To avoid the
constitutional uncertainty that may have arisen if the Register of Copyrights (a
member of the legislative branch) appointed members to this new administrative
body, Congress decided to create an independent regulatory agency.3" This agency
was known as the Copyright Royalty Tribunal ("CRT. The CRT became an
independent agency in the Legislative Branch that received support from the
Library of Congress and had its decisions reviewed directly by the Federal Court
of Appeals. 3
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal ("CRT") existed in one form or another from
1977 to 1993.32 During this period Congress created new statutory licenses and
eliminated one of the existing licenses. 33 In 1982, the CRT came under intense
fire from the Cable Industry.34 The CRT decided to set the royalty rate that cable
systems must pay when they retransmit certain copyrighted television programming.35 Ted Turner, of Turner Broadcasting, called for the abolition of CRT and
testified before Congress,36 "[t]his CRT decision puts us out of business."37

id
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-4 (1976) (holding appointments of legislative officials by
2.
someone other than the President unconstitutional); see general# U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
7

28

29 id

0 CARP Hearings, rupranote 17, at 33.
3'See id at 15-22 (statement of Robert A. Garrett, attorney-at-law).
32 Id

at 33.

" Congress created a new statutory license in 1998 to govern retransmission of over-the-air
television signals to home satellite dish owners. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000). Congress also eliminated
the jukebox compulsory license due to the fact that there were sufficient private license agreements
by this time. In 1992, Congress also created a statutory license the manufacture and for importation
of digital audio recording technology ("DART"'). See 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000).
' CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 16.
35 Id

' At this time, Ted Turner was President of Turner Broadcasting and was testifying in his
capacity as a representative of the cable broadcasting industry. Seegeneral4 About TS, Inc.: Coporate
History, available at http://www.rurner.com/about/history.html (discussing the company and
Turner's role then).
37 Cab Copyight and Signal CarrageAct of 1982: Joint Heating on H.R. 5949 Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Sdence, and Transp. and the Comm. on the Judicagy, 97 th Cong. 114 (1982).
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During the remainder of the 1980s and the early 19 9 0s, several proposals were
considered by Congress concerning the structure of royalty rate-setting and
distribution. These included basically everything from eliminating compulsory
licenses altogether and allowing market negotiations, to privatizing the system, to
38
a host of other ideas.
In 1993, Congress concluded that a full time agency was not justified and thus
enacted the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993."9 This legislation
abolished the CRT and replaced it with the ad hoc CARP system now in place.
C. CURRENT CARP STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

Under the current CARP system, ad hoc arbitration panels are administered
by the Librarian of Congress and the Copyright Office.4" The CARPs adjust
royalty rates and distribute royalties collected under the various compulsory
licenses and statutory obligations of the Copyright Act.4 These compulsory or
statutory licensing provisions compel copyright owners to license certain uses of
their works to different parties who then pay the prescribed royalty.
Whenever there is a controversy on the distribution of compulsory copyright
royalties or the adjustment of copyright royalty rates, the Librarian of Congress
is authorized to convene a three-person CARP.42 Administrative responsibilities
prior to the declaration of a controversy are assigned to the Copyright Office.
Congress believed that placing the panel under the supervision of the Register
of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress made good sense due to the fact that
both of these offices were already significantly involved in the process.43

CARP Hearings,supranote 17, at 19.
39 id; Seegenerah5 Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L No. 103-198,107 Stat.
2304 (codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 251-253, 257, 259 (2001)).
o 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2000). See 17 U.S.C. S 801, 802 (2000) (for statutes covering Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panels: Establishment and Purpose, and Membership and Proceedings of
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels, respectively).
41 17 U.S.C. § 801 (b)(1) (2000).
42 17 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2000) (the Librarian of Congress selects two arbitrators from lists provided
byprofessional arbitration associations). 17 U.S.C. § 802(b) (2000) (qualifications ofthese arbitrators
include experience in conducting arbitration proceedings and any qualifications which the Librarian
of Congress shall adopt. The two arbitrators selected by the Librarian will, within ten days of their
selection, choose a third person from the same lists, and this third person will serve as the
chairperson of the arbitrators. If the two initial arbitrators cannot agree on the third person, the
Librarian selects the third arbitrator.).
43 H.R. REP. No. 103-286, at 11(1993) (the Copyright Office was already involved through their
licensing division, which received royalty payments; the Register's Office was involved through the
Register and the General Counsel, who promulgate regulations related to the statutory licenses.
These offices continue to be significandy involved in CARP proceedings.); 17 U.S.C. § 801 (d) (2000)
(The Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, shall provide
39
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Additionally, Congress believed that ad hoc arbitration panels would be more
efficient than full time commissioners.'
These ad hoc arbitration panels recommend the royalty rate and distribution
of royalty fees collected under the statutory licenses. In addition, they set the
terms and conditions of certain statutory licenses. Each three person CARP is
selected for a particular proceeding and has 180 days to deliver a recommendation
to the Librarian of Congress."5
A typical CARP proceeding evolves as follows: initially, once a dispute or
controversy arises, the Copyright Office designates a voluntary negotiation period
among the parties to negotiate their dispute.' If an agreement is not met in
negotiation, the parties proceed to a CARP. Each participant in the proceeding
must then submit a written direct case. This sets forth the party's reasons as to
what the party believes the rates or distribution should be. Next, the Copyright
Office conducts a limited discovery period.4" Once discovery is concluded, the
Librarian selects two arbitrators from a list of designated arbitrators." These two
arbitrators then select a third arbitrator from this list to serve as their
chairperson."
The arbitrators then consider the written testimony submitted by the parties.'5s
They may conduct oral hearings, and parties often present rebuttal testimony. '
After considering the evidence and testimony presented (within the 180-day time
limit) the panel delivers a written recommendation5 2of what the royalty rate or
distribution should be to the Librarian of Congress.
Once the Librarian receives the CARP report, he has ninety days to either
accept the report, or reject it.53 The Register of Copyrights is also required to

advise the Librarian on his decision.'

If the CARP report is rejected, the

the copyright arbitration royalty panels with the necessary administrative services related to

proceedings under this chapter.").
H.R. REP. No. 103-286, at 11 (1993).
17 U.S.C. § 802(e) (2000).
CARP Heatings, spra note 17, at 34 (discussing the highlights of the CARP system).
SSee id(during this limited discovery period, the parties may request from each other
documentation that supports the assertions they make in their written direct cases).
See 17 U.S.C. § 802(b) (2000) (discussing the selection process of arbitrators).
's

49Id

soCARP Hearings, smpra note 17, at 34.
51Id
52 Id (the court may also permit oral arguments on the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law at this stage of the proceeding). See alro 17 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) (describing
membership and proceedings of copyright arbitration royalty panels).

53

17 U.S.C. § 802() (2000).

' Id ('The Librarian shall adopt the determination of the arbitration panel unless the Librarian
finds that the determination is arbitrary or contrary to the applicable provisions of this title 117
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Librarian has thirty days to issue a final order setting forth the rate adjustment or
distribution." The Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights may
deduct from royalty fees collected or deposited reasonable costs incurred in these
proceedings.5 6 Any party wishing to appeal the decision may do so by appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuity
D. THE WEBCASTING DECISION

Since its creation in 1993, the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel system has
conducted nine full proceedings."s The most recent and arguably the most
controversial CARP decision dealt with the royalty rate that webcasters must pay
when they transmit sound recordings over the Intemet. 59
In order to webcast music, an operator must obtain two licenses. The first is
the license for the underlying musical composition (the written notes and lyrics).
This is often referred to as a "musical work".' The second license the user must
obtain is the license to the actual recording itself (the "sound recording"). 6'
Generally, the license to perform or reproduce a musical composition can be

U.S.C. § 8021.").
ss Id
- 17 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (2000). Note, however, that 'reasonable' is not statutorily defined and
these costs can become quite large. See infra Section III.
s 17 U.S.C. § 80 2 (g) (2000) (any decision of the Librarian with respect to a determination of an
arbitration panel may be appealed by any aggrieved party who would be bound by the determination.
This appeal is to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and must
be brought within thirty days after the publication of the Librarian's decision in the Federal Register.
The court may only modify or vacate a decision of the Librarian if it finds that the Librarian acted
in an arbitrary manner. The court may either remand the case to the Librarian or enter its own
determination with respect to the amount or distribution of royalty fees and costs. If no appeal is
brought within thirty days, the decision is final.). See ako CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 34 (six
decisions of the Librarian have been appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, and in each instance, the Librarian's decision was upheld).
s CARP Heings, supranote 17, at 34.
s See U.S. Copyright Office, Rates and Terms for... Webcasfing, at http://www.copyright.gov/
carp/webcasting-rates.html (last modified Feb. 24,2003) (providing for a timeline and overview of
this decision). Digital audio transmission known as webcasting is covered by statutory license. See
17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000) (describing the scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings), § 112
(enumerating the limitations on exclusive rights in the case of ephemeral recordings); see also Munsat,
supranote 16, at 147 ("Cebcasting generally refers to the streaming of audio on the Internet. It is
sometimes called 'Internet radio.' Webcasters often transmit several different channels of
uninterrupted music divided into highly themed genres [e.g., classical, alternative rock, etc.]. Other
webcasters retransmit the signals of over-the-air radio programming.").
60 Munsat, .rupra note 16, at 147.
61 Id
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obtained from one of the three major songwriter and publisher groups.62 The
sound recording rights are usually owned by the record company that recorded
and distributed the material.63 However, in some instances, the webcaster may be
able to obtain a statutory license to perform sound recordings on the Internet.
In order to qualify for a statutory license, the webcaster must meet certain
conditions."
These statutory licenses are a result of the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA)." The DPRA established a sound-recording
performance right for digital transmissions. The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA),66 signed by President Clinton in 1998, further amended the
Copyright Act. The DMCA was a piece of legislation that addressed many issues
related to technology and the Internet, and it provided for, inter
aia,a statutory
67
license for webcasters that do not provide on-demand services.
Webcasters who meet the statutory license requirements discussed previously
must first notify sound recording copyright owners by filing an "Initial Notice"
with the Copyright Office.6" The statutory license did not provide for a royalty
rate so webcasters were forced to negotiate with copyright owners. Many of these
negotiations were unsuccessful,69 and therefore, the Librarian of Congress had to

' Id at 148 (discussing the three major performance rights organizations: ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC). Performance rights organizations are businesses designed to represent songwriters and
publishers, primarily in their rights to receive compensation for the public performances of their
works. SESAC, Inc., About SESAC, at http://www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/aboutsesacl.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2003).
63 Munsat, smpra note 16, at 148.
- See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2000) (detailing the conditions that must be met for a webcaster to
qualify for a statutory license).
65 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
6 Pub. L No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17

U.S.C.).

67 17 U.S.C. 114(d)(2) (2000) (granting copyright holders the exclusive right to
authorize ondemand webcasts (on-demand refers to the ability of a listener to be able to request a particular song
at a particular time)). See also Rose, supra note 11, at 331 (noting that other key provisions of the
DMCA include: "(1) mak[ing] it a crime to circumvent "built-in" anti-copying measures to prevent
copyright infringement of the software; (2) outlaw[ing] the manufacture, sale, or distribution of
devices that can crack software protection codes; (3) limit[ing] liability of [ISPsJ and [OSPs] from
copyright infringement when acting solely as a conduit for transmitting information; [and] (4)
creat[ing] a new license for sound recordings that are digitally transmitted").
The Copyright Office has forms available for this purpose. See U.S. Copyright Office, Forms,
at http://www.copyright.gov/forms (last modified Mar. 25,2003) (providing downloadable forms
and information on how to request forms by mail).
69 See Steve Gordon, ExaminingArguments in Controwry Over Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 No. 6
ENT. L & FIN. 1 (2002) (noting that initial negotiations were unsuccessful because the record
companies were asking for more than many webcasters were willing to pay).
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convene a CARP to determine the rate.70 These rates are supposed to represent
the rates that "would have 71been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing
buyer and a willing seller."
On February 20,2002, the CARP delivered its report recommending the rates
and terms for webcasting to the Librarian of Congress. 2 On May 21, 2002, the
Librarian of Congress issued an order rejecting the CARP's recommendation on
webcasting rates and terms.73 The Librarian issued his final determination on
June 20, 2002.
The Librarian ruled that a rate of $.07 was the appropriate rate for both
Internet-only retransmissions and AM/FM radio broadcasts.74 The ruling was
based largely on previous marketplace deals, of which there had only been one.7
The Librarian accepted the CARP's conclusion that the RIAA/Yahoo! Agreement
(the only marketplace deal) represented the "best evidence of what rates would
have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
'
seller."76
This hearing was quite extensive and extremely controversial.77 There is little
doubt that webcasters were displeased with the decision of the Librarian. 78 Their

primary complaint was, quite simply, that the rates set by the CARP, and adopted
by the Librarian of Congress would put many webcasters out of business. 79 The
70

See Munsat, supra note 16, at 153.

71 Gordon, spra note 69.
72 U.S. Copyright Office, Rates and Termsfor... Webcasting, at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/

webcasting-rates.html (last modified Feb. 24,2003). See Ryan Naraine, Webcarting Royalty RatesSficed
in Ha#f, at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/1369281 (June 20, 2002) (noting
that the initial recommendation by CARP was for a two-tiered rate structure of 0.14 cents per
performance for Intemet-only retransmissions and 0.07 cents for retransmissions of AM/FM radio
broadcasts).
" U.S. Copyright Office, Rates and Termsfor... Webcasting, at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/
webcasting__rates.htnl (last modified Feb. 24, 2003).
7' Naraine, supra note 72.
7s The only marketplace deal that had taken place was between the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) and Yahool. This deal set the benchmark for Web radio royalty
payments. Id
76 Id (quoting the Librarian of Congress).
'n The webcasting CARP consumed over forty days of evidentiary hearings and generated almost
15,000 pages of transcript. CARP Heaings,supranote 17, at 16.
s See, e.g., InternetNews, Webcasting Royalties, at http://internetnews.com/index.php/4901 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2003) (indexing articles debating the Librarian's decision and documenting the
resulting developments).
79 Gordon, supranote 69. Indeed, more than 200 Intemet-based stations shut down immediately
following the rate decision. Id "More than 30 percent of U.S. Internet radio stations have stopped
broadcasting in the past year, and some webcasters are moving operations overseas to avoid paying
a royalty that takes effect next month [October, 2002 for copyrighted music." William Glanz, U.S.
Webcasterr Hit Hardby Royalty Decision, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002. Bitsee, Michael Papish, College
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°
Recording Industry Association of America (C"RA")S
complains that the rates
are too low. RIAA claims that Webcasting will have a negative effect on already
faltering record sales.81 They claim that if the recording industry is going to
survive, future income must be derived more from licensing than from sales of
CDs.82 RIAA also states that the licensing royalties must be shared with artists,
background musicians, and music unions.8 3
As a result of the decision of the Librarian of Congress, both sides to this
issue filed notices of appeal with the Federal Court of Appeals in Washington,
D.C. Also, on July 26, 2002, a bill was introduced in the United States House of
Representatives that would exempt some small webcasters from paying the full
royalty [See Section V Recent Legislation, infra].' Most importantly, however, the
Webcasting decision brought to light many of the problems of the current royalty
setting system (CARP).

III. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING CARP STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
The problems with the existing structure can generally be lumped into one of
three categories: 1) the costs of CARP proceedings; 2) the instability and
inconsistency of CARP decisions; and 3) the inefficiency with which small claims
are handled in the CARP system.
A. THE COSTS OF CARP PROCEEDINGS

The most serious flaw in the current CARP process is the expense of the
proceeding.8" Participants in a CARP proceeding bear not only their own
substantial legal fees, but also the cost of the CARP proceeding itself. This can
include costs for things such as expert witness fees, consultant fees, arbitrator
fees, Copyright Office costs, out-of-pocket expenses, and time lost from running
businesses and producing copyrighted works.8 6 Howard L. Berman stated that:

Rado, Stnrgglng to be Heard, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at B2 (stating "[t]he shutdowns [of
webcasters] were premature, and in the end will probably turn out to have been unnecessary").
o The Recording Industry Association of America is a trade group whose members produce
and control ninety percent of all legitimate sound recordings in the world.
8 Gordon, supranote 69.

82I
3 Id
H.R. 5285 was introduced by Representatives Inslee, Nethercutt, and Boucher, and provided
that Web based radio stations with less than $6 million in annual revenue would be exempt from
paying the full royalty. See infra Section V.A.
"sCARP Hearnngs, supranote 17, at 3 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman).
86Id at 17 (prepared statement of Robert Alan Garrett, attorney-at-law). Mr. Garrett is apartner
in the law firm of Arnold & Porter and represents, inter aia,the recording industry in proceedings
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"[t]his is often millions of dollars, sometimes much more expensive than the
royalty claim that the CARP is addressing."87 The costs can be "astronomical.""M
These tremendous costs are not consistent with the goal of compulsory licensing,
i.e. the reduction of transaction costs.8 9
The process is beyond the ability of many interested parties to afford.9" Also,
forcing private parties to pay the arbitrator's fees is "unjust to the financially less
fortunate and to the nonprofit entities that have a very large interest in the
proceedings of the CARP."'
The cost of the current CARP process is a concern for all parties, "whether
it is a copyright owner or a copyright user, a small party or a large party., 92 The
well-funded party ends up shouldering the burden for entire industries standing
to benefit from the statutory licenses. On the other hand, small parties are
disadvantaged financially as well. They must either, "rely upon the records
developed by the participating parties [parties to the CARP proceeding] or resort
to voluntary negotiations with the copyright owners on terms they may otherwise
find objectionable."93 Thus, it is clear that the potentially "astronomical" costs
of a CARP proceeding can impact both sides of the dispute. The costs are also
significant to the CARP "institution".94 The Copyright Office and the Library of
Congress personnel must conduct various phases of the proceedings."
B. THE INSTABILI'TY AND INCONSISTENCY OF CARP DECISIONS

Stability and consistency in judicial decisions allows parties to litigation to
adequately assess litigation risks and to adequately determine prospects for
settlement. These qualities (stability and consistency) are needed in CARP

before the Copyright Office and the CARPs. Id at 6.
87 Id at 3 (statement of Howard L. Berman).
" Idat 26 (statement of Bruce Rich, attorney-at-law).
89 Id at 17 (statement of Robert Alan Garrett, attorney-at-law). The goal of compulsory
licensing is the reduction in transaction costs between parties. The tremendous costs of these
proceedings have the effect of "decreasing the compulsory licensing royalties that copyright owners
receive and increasing the amounts that copyright users must pay for the compulsory license-a result
that is inherently antithetical to a principal purpose of compulsory licensing.
Id
0 CARP Hearings, sfupra note 17, at 4 (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher).
, Id See also supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
92 CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 15 (statement of Robert Alan Garrett, attorney-at-law).
93 Id.at 26.
94 Id.at 35.
95 Id. Examples of the duties that the Copyright Office and the Library of Congress must
undertake include discovery relating to the written direct cases submitted by the parties, and review
of the CARPs' decisions. Id
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proceedings as well, but are largely lacking.96 The ad hoc nature of CARP
arbitration panels makes consistency difficult, if not impossible to obtain.97
Because the panelists are selected for each hearing, it is often the case that they
may never participate in another CARP proceeding. Thus, any expertise
developed during the process (e.g., in rate-setting or subject matter) will not likely
benefit future proceedings."'
Also, rates made by these ad hoc panels are often too narrow to establish
precedent. This results from the fact that the decision is often rendered on a
basis that "focus[es] on reaching a bottom-line result in the given proceeding
rather than on explicating a thorough and complete analysis of the relevant
standards. . ... 99
Lastly, since panelists are typically not the same from hearing to hearing,
parties who are dissatisfied with one panel are tempted to return and try a
different panel."°
C. INEFFICIENCY WIIh WHICH SMALL CLAIMS ARE HANDLED

"Claimants with small claims have been able to use existing CARP rules to
prolong CARP proceedings and derail settlements at virtually no cost to
themselves, but at substantial cost to all other interested parties.
The inefficiency of small claims in CARP proceedings is obvious when one
looks at the arbitrator costs of a proceeding compared to the amount-incontroversy. In many cases, the fee exceeds the disputed amount. For instance:
[Tihe costs of the arbitrators in the 1992-94 Digital Audio Recording Technology ("DART") distribution proceeding, which resulted
in an award of $11.03 to two individual claimants were more than

CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 17.
current process will lead to panels constantly "reinventing the wheel." CARP Hearings,
supranote 17, at 4 (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher). Furthermore, the process results in decisions
that "neither build meaningfully on prior precedent, nor establish the kinds of first principles that
typify decisions by Federal courts." Id at 23.
9' CARP Hearings,supranote 17, at 26 (statement of Bruce Rich, attorney-at-law). In addition
to a lack of consistency, the fact that new panelists are chosen for each proceeding also leads to an
increase in cost, as the arbitrator often must spend considerable time getting up to speed on the
subject matter.
Id at 23. Compare this to the body of federal jurisprudence where, "first principles" tend to
guide the resolution of cases.
" The Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, reports that the Librarian [of Congress] tries to
select arbitrators who have served on previous panels, but the panelists are rarely the same. See
CARP Hearings,supranote 17, at 35.
1o,Id at 12 (prepared statement of Michael J. Remington, attorney-at-law).
96

97 The
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$12,000 (more than one thousand times the amount-in-controversy); the costs of the arbitrators in the 1995-98 DART distribution proceeding, which resulted in a total award of $6.06 to the
same two individual claimants ($5.04 to one and $1.02 to the
second) were in excess of $21,000 (almost three thousand times the
amount-in-controversy); and in the 1991 Cable Distribution.
Proceeding (Phase II), the arbitrators awarded $63.74 to an
individual claimant, yet the costs of the arbitrators were more than
five hundred times that amount." 2
In addition, each of the matters above was appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia (and greater costs incurred)." 3 Furthermore, the above costs are not inclusive of outside attorneys' fees, in-house
attorneys' fees or staff time."4 When costs are this substantial in relation to the
amount-in-controversy, "the CARP system is not an efficient and effective
05
dispute-resolution device."'
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE TO CARP STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
The House Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property recently held an oversight hearing (the CARP hearing) in which both
Subcommittee Members and industry participants and representatives provided
comments on possible changes to CARP structure and process." Most of the
proposals centered on trying to alleviate the aforementioned problems (i.e., the
cost of proceedings, the instability and inconsistency of decisions, and the
inefficiency with which small claims are handled). The following 'system wide'
proposals were offered by various parties to the CARP Hearing-'0 7

102 Id Mr. Remington is an attorney-at-law and partner at Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, where
he isWashington, D.C. counsel for Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), "a performing rights organization
representing hundreds of thousands of songwriters, composers and music publishers in the licensing
of the public performance right in their musical works." Id at 7; "Arbitrators [in CARP proceedings]
are typically compensated at between $200 and $400 an hour for their work." C4RPHearings,supra
note 17, at 35.
103 CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 12.
104

Id

lOS1d
'06 See generaly C4RP Hearings, supra note

17, at 1-48.
In addition to these 'system-wide' proposals, numerous specific proposals aimed at different
processes within CARP were proposed and considered. See infra Section IV.C.
107
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A. ELIMINATION OF COMPULSORY LICENSES

One of the more drastic proposals offered includes the elimination of
statutory licenses altogether."'8 This 'marketplace' solution to royalty disputes
would enable copyright owners to seek the highest royalties the market would
bear. Representative Berman suggests, "CARP participants, both licensees and
copyright owners, would have found a far more satisfactory outcome had they
chosen to spend their money and effort negotiating a reasonable settlement in the
marketplace rather than in a CARP.' 09
This solution would certainly reduce the cost of CARP proceedings (i.e.,
eliminate the proceedings altogether). It would also address another problem of
statutory licenses, in the fact that they tend to outlive their purpose and create
marketplace dislocations."'
However, this proposal is not necessarily airtight. It is unclear whether small
webcasters would be adequately protected from anti-competitive behavior by
copyright owners. While U.S. antitrust laws would presumably protect these
smaller players, the costs of bringing an antitrust action may make protection
unavailable, or at least impractical for many."'
B. TRANSFER OF CARP FUNCTION TO A COURT OF LAW

Several commentators have suggested that the function currently performed
by ad hoc panels should be transferred to a court of law. " 2 It is argued that these

10' CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 49.
109 Id

110Id at 49-50. The problem of statutory licenses outliving their purpose can be exposed by
looking at cable compulsory licenses. These licenses were created to help an infant cable industry
compete with the broadcast industry. While the licenses still exist today, the cable industry certainly
possesses significant market power (and presumably the statutory licenses are not needed).
"' The high cost of bringing an antitrust proceeding against a copyright owner could be as
burdensome as a CARP Proceeding in some instances. If this is the case, this is not a viable option,
and the benefits of a marketplace solution no longer outweigh the burden imposed by a traditional
CARP Proceeding (at least for less financially advantaged participants such as webcasters).
112 Se enera4y CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 10-11 (suggesting "[a]ny reform should eliminate
the adhoc nature of the process either through a standing cadre of administrative copyright judges
on salary equipped with a professional staff . . . or appointment of a permanent, salaried
administrative copyright judge (with part-time, salaried colleagues) supported by a professional
staff'); id at 24 (stating that "serious consideration [should be] given to transferring the rate-setting
and distribution functions currently carried out by CARP Panels to a court of law"); id at 28
(continuing "[iindeed, were determinations of statutory license fees reposed in the federal courts,
virtually all of the procedural flaws inherent in the existing CARP process would be remedied or, at
the least, ameliorated").
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functions (rate-making and distribution of royalties) do not require the expertise
of the Library of Congress." 3 Instead, what is required is
[A] facility with macroeconomics and with basic principles of
antitrust law, the ability to assimilate facts concerning multiple
media marketplaces, the ability to evaluate complex statistical and
economic data put forth by the parties' experts, and the ability to
sift through and properly evaluate record evidence, including
making judgments on issues such as witness credibility." 4
It is argued that transferring this function to a court of law would increase
continuity among decisionmakers, and thereby increase the consistency of
decisions."' There are numerous Constitutional issues which must be considered
if this proposal were adopted." 6
C. OTHER PROPOSALS

Several other measures have been proposed to alleviate many of the
aforementioned problems. While many of these proposals do have merit, none
taken individually would be likely to ameliorate the CARP structural or procedural
7
11

flaws.

1. Elimination of Evidentiay Hearings and Discovery. It has been proposed that
8
evidentiary hearings should be eliminated (or at least greatly restricted in scope)."
This would result in a paper proceeding, which is typical of many administrative
agency proceedings." 9 Some argue that the evidentiary hearing is the single largest

Id at 28.
"' Id (suggesting that a traditional court of law, such as a Federal District Court, would meet
these requirements).
"s CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 11.
116 Id at 28 (contemplating that transferring the functions of CARP Panels
(rate-making and
royalty distribution) to a Federal district court would certainly raise separation of powers concerns.
Since rate-making is arguably not a judicial function, Artide III judges may be tasked with
conducting non-Artide III functions. There isprecedent for resolving rate disputes in district courts
(ASCAP and BMI rate courts, e.g.), and certain steps could be taken (i.e. retention of certain powers
by the Copyright Office itself) which would mitigate some Constitutional concerns.).
117 The author has adopted the view that a significant change is needed to permanently address
the structural and procedural flaws with the CARP. Note, however, that a combination of these
proposals would certainly provide a 'patch' and may be sufficient under the circumstances.
11s CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 15.
"i3

119 Id

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss2/11

16

Maxey: That CARP Is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels - Ch

2003]

THAT CARP IS NO KEEPER

12 °
It has also been proposed that discovery
cost to clients in a CARP Proceeding.
12
'
restricted.
be eliminated or
2. Establishmentofa FilingFee. An industry representative to the CARP hearing
suggested that there should be a uniform filing fee analogous to the filing fee for
a federal civil action."2 This filing fee would ensure that each party "share[s] a
base-level burden of the costs of the proceeding."'" This fee would help defray
some of the administrative costs incurred by the Copyright Office in connection
with these proceedings.' 24 Most importantly, the filing fee would discourage the
filing of frivolous claims and encourage settlement of claims.
3. OfferingJudgment to Small Claimants. In cases where the costs of arbitration
proceedings may exceed the amount-in-controversy, an offer of judgment may be
claims, and would
This would "encourage settlement of small
appropriate."1
2 6
promote the imposition of sanctions in instances of abuse.
4. Elimination of OralHearingsin Small ClaimProceedings. Mr. Remington states,

cases involving small claims (defined statutorily) should automatically be subjected to a paper proceeding. In matters where no
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Office should be statutorily
authorized to make a summary judgment decision based on facts
not in dispute, applicable law and precedents, before the CARP is
empanelled.' 7
V. RECENT LEGISLATION
The legislature has been active in the past year addressing issues relevant to
royalty proceedings, particularly webcasting. Several pieces of legislation have
been introduced, including the Internet Radio Fairness Act, the Small Webcaster
Settlement Act, and the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003.

0 See id at 21 (noting that "the most recent CARP proceeding involved 40 days of adversarial
evidentiary hearings and generated almost 15,000 pages of transcript").
121 Id at 15.
122 Id at 12-13; se also 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2000) (stating that the filing fee for litigants filing actions
in federal district courts is currently $150.00).
123 CARP Hearing, supra note 17, at 13.
124 id

This offer of judgment would be similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which
provides that a party defending a claim may offer to allow judgment to be taken against the
defendant, with costs then accrued. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
12 CARP Hearings,supra note 17, at 13.
125 Id

127Id
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A. THE INTERNET RADIO FAIRNESS ACT

Washington Representative Jay Inslee introduced H.R. 5285, the "Internet
Radio Fairness Act," on July 26, 2002, in response to the Librarian of Congress'
webcasting decision and the resulting shut-down of many web radio broadcasts. 298
The Act is designed to make the CARP process fairer for smaller entities.'
Inslee stated
Congress should support creative and innovative uses for new
technology, not drive small web radio broadcasters out of business
with huge fees. We need to refine the current law on digital
technology quickly, before more small web radio broadcasters are
forced out of business. Changing the standard for setting royalty
rates is crucial to the survival of this innovative sector. We seek a
balance between just compensation and Internet development.
This process must be fair but not free. 3 '
Representative George Nethercutt, a co-sponsor of the measure, stated, "No
one wins under the current CARP standard-webcasters will close shop,
consumers lose access to a wide selection of programming, and copyright holders
collect nothing. Our legislation protects small businesses from the onerous CARP
ruling, ensuring the continuation of webcasting ... ",'
Inslee noted the flaws in the current CARP process, "[Ihe result of this ...
webcasting CARP demonstrated some structural flaws in the process that
Congress must remedy.'1 2 Some of the provisions of the Act indicate that:
(1) Small businesses'3 3 will be exempted from the most recent
royalty decision;
(2) All future CARPs must change the royalty rate standard from
the "willing-buyer/willing-seller" to the traditional standard
under the 1976 Copyright Act; '

123Jay Inslee, Inslee Inrodces 'nternet RadioFairnessAct":RoyaltiesPaidby Web Radio StationsShould
be 'TairButNot Free" July 26,2002), availabk at http://www.house.gov/inslee/tech-internetradio.

htm.
12

Id

131 Id
132 Id

13 Small businesses are defined as those that receive $6 million or less in gross revenue. Inslee,

supra note 128.
" Id The traditional standard under the 1976 Copyright Act refers to the "fairness" standard,
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(3) Small businesses will be exempted from the payment
require35
ments for participation in future CARP proceedings
(4) All future CARPs must eliminate fees for ephemeral recordings
that web broadcasters create to facilitate the transmission of the
song to users. 36
(5) All future CARPs must comply with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.'37

This Bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property on August 20, 2002, but did not result in any further
38
legislative action.1
B.

SMALL WEBCASTER SETILEMENT ACT

On November 15, 2002 the United States Senate passed a revised version of
H.R. 5469, the "Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002."19 The Bill was
originally blocked by Senator Helms, who eventually played an active role in
crafting the new version.
Highlights of the Bill include:
-The Bill enables small Internet radio services and the recording
industry to enter into settlement agreements.
-The recording industry and small webcasters, including noncommercial webcasters, can now agree to rates, notwithstanding the
CARP's decision.
-This legislation authorizes the RIAA and small webcasters to go
through with a previously agreed-upon measure. The measure

as opposed to the "willing-buyer, willing-seller" standard used in the Webcasting decision.
"' During the webcasting CARP, all participants were forced to pay an equal share of the total
costs, therefore many small businesses were unable to participate. Inslee, sApra note 128.
136 An emphemeral recording is a temporary recording made to facilitate webcasting. These
recordings have no independent economic value, and accordingly they should not be subject to a
royalty payment. Id
137 I,
13'Library

of Congress, BillSurnary&Statwforthe 107th Congass: H.R. 5285, at http://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
139 Library of Congress, BillSmmary &Statusforthe 107th Congress: H.R. 5469, at http://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dl07:l:./temp/-bdlQ7H:@@@L&summ2=m&l/bss/dl O7query.
html/status. This Bill was signed by President George W. Bush on Dec. 4,2002 and became Pub.
L. 107-321 (2002).
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called for a percentage-of-revenue royalty system that differs
significantly from the CARP decision.'"
-This Bill also requires that artists be paid their share of royalties
directly (instead of paying the royalty to record companies). 4 '
This Bill essentially overrules the royalty rate dictated by the earlier CARP
decision, and allows parties to privately negotiate lower royalty rates.
The Bill's approval was seen as a victory for all involved. Jonathon Potter,
executive director of the Digital Media Associations said, "[t]oday's congressional
approval of the Small Webcaster Settlement Act is a victory for all consumers and
providers on Internet radio."' 42 Likewise, "[T1he Senate's approval was met with
a sigh of relief from industry players who have already been negotiating with the
music industry to set lower royalty rates.""' Finally, "The ultimate victory here
is for consumers... this will maintain the maximum diversity of Internet radio
and programming."'"
C. COPYRIGHT ROYALI1Y AND DISTRIBUTION REFORM ACT OF 2003

On March 25,2003, Texas Representative Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 1415,
the "Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003.' ' 141 This very
significant piece of legislation seeks to address the CARP structure and process
problems by eliminating the CARP system altogether, and replacing it with a
Copyright Royalty judge.'"

140"The proposed rate plan would allow the small broadcasters to pay royalties worth 10 percent
of their revenues, or 7 percent of their expenses, depending on which is higher, on revenue up to
$250,000 a year. For revenues exceeding $250,000 a year, the small webcasters would pay 12 percent
of royalties or 7 percent of expenses in royalties." Scarlet Pruitt, CongressApproves Bill to Heo Small
Webaasters,athttp://archive.infoworld.com/articles/hu/xml /02/11/15/02115hnwebcasters.xml?s
=IDGNS.
' Blogcritics.org, BackgroundfromSen.Helms Office on New WebcasterBill,athttp://blogcritics.org/
archives/2002/11/16/000007.php (Nov. 15, 2002).
142Pruitt,supra note 140.
143Id

14 I (quotingJonathon Potter, Executive Director of the Digital Media Associations (DiMA)).
14sH.R.

146Id

1417, 108th Cong.
See also Rep. Lamar Smith, An Address to ASCAP, Astin, TX, Apr. 16,2003, available at

http://lamarsmith.house.gov/News.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=214 (noting that this legislation
was introduced to "address the concerns users had with the CARP system-namely that decisions
are unpredictable and inconsistent, unnecessarily expensive, and that many CARP claims are
frivolous").
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Under H.R. 1417, the Librarian of Congress would appoint a Copyright
Royalty Judge to a full-time salaried position for a five-year term. 47 This judge
would be "an attorney with 10 or more years of legal practice with demonstrated
experience in administrative hearings or court trials and demonstrated knowledge
of copyright law."' 48 The Copyright Royalty Judge would also have a support
staff consisting of two full-time staff members with "expertise in copyright law
and in the business and economics of industries affected by the actions taken by
the Copyright Royalty Judge."' 49
The Copyright Royalty Judge would have independent decisionmaking
authority. 5 ' The Copyright Office would "act in an administrative and advisory
capacity only."'' The legislation addresses the cost issue by creating a salaried
position that would "eliminate the large per-hour arbitrator fees of the current
system [CARP]."'5
The appointment for a five-year term would "promote
institutional stability and permit participants to gain familiarity with the
decisionmaker, thereby creating reliable results and promoting settlements."'' 3
This legislation seems to have broad support. "Perhaps for the first time in
decades, there is a copyright matter before Congress upon which lawmakers, the
Register of Copyright, as well as representatives for the content and user
communities all agree: the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) must go."
"s4
However, while now all seem to agree that CARP must go, it remains to be
seen whether the appointment of a Copyright Royalty Judge
would eliminate all
S
of the current problems or just create a host of others.

147 id.
148 id
149

Id

" Smith, suira note 146.
151 Id
152

Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act:

Legislative Hearing Before the House

Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
153
154

d

Bill Holland, Smith wantsjude to replace CARP, BILLBOARD, Apr. 12, 2003 (discussing H.R.

1417).
155

This legislation is still pending in the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual

Property. Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress: H.R. 1417, at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HRO1417:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Apr. 23,

2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are significant problems with the current CARP process and structure,
as evidenced by the result of the latest CARP decision regarding the rates
webcasters must pay when they transmit sound recordings over the Intemet.
The costs of CARP proceedings are astronomical and are often so large that
it becomes cost-prohibitive for smaller players to participate in CARP proceedings. They are forced to negotiate deals in the marketplace (often on unfavorable
terms) or to simply "live" with the decision of the CARP.
The current structure also does not produce consistent or predictable results.
The ad hoc nature of the CARPs results in panels that are rarely the same, and the
results are often "narrowly-tailored." The CARP structure is also not designed
to efficiently handle small claims. In many instances, the cost of the proceeding
is hundreds of times the royalty amount-in-controversy.
Several proposals. have been offered by parties interested in the current and
future structure of a rate-setting body (ifany). Some of the more drastic proposals
include the elimination of compulsory licenses altogether and the transfer of the
CARP function to a court of law. The marketplace proposal of eliminating
compulsory licenses would certainly reduce the cost of proceedings, but it would
likely not provide adequate protection for small players such as webcasters. The
transfer of the CARP function to a court of law would likely reduce the
inconsistency and unpredictability problems of the current CARP structure.
However, it is unclear whether this would pass constitutional muster. There are
many questions left unanswered in this regard.
Some of the more "modest" proposals include the establishment of a filing
fee, which would discourage frivolous claims, and may have a negligible effect on
the cost problem; changing rules regarding discovery and oral hearings, which
may address some of the problems with efficiency of small claims; offering
judgment to small claimants, which may offer efficiency improvements; and
several other proposals. Each of these individually, however, will likely only
temporarily address the larger issues and problems of the current CARP process
and structure. Drastic changes, like those proposed by the legislature, address
these concerns.
Several pieces of legislation have been introduced in the past year, including
the "Internet Radio Fairness Act,'"1 6 the "Small Webcaster Settlement Act of
'
2002, '157
and the "Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003.' ' 5

16 H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. (2002).
157Pub. L No. 107-321 (2002).
151H.R. 1417, 108th Cong. (2003).
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The most significant of these legislative proposals, the Copyright Royalty and
Distribution Reform Act of 2003, calls for the replacement of the CARP system
altogether. Under this legislation, the Librarian of Congress would appoint a
salaried Copyright Royalty Judge to a five-year term. This legislation addresses
the primary problems of the current CARP system (namely, the costs of CARP
proceedings, and the instability and inconsistency of CARP decisions). While
there seems to be broad support for this legislation, it remains to be seen whether
it will adequately address the problems of the existing CARP structure and
process, and prove to be a viable model for participants in a royalty rate dispute
and distribution proceedings.
In summary, this is a quickly evolving issue that has garnered much political
attention of late. There seems to be little debate that change to the CARP
structure and process is needed, and drastic change at that. It is, however, still
unclear how the legislature will choose to deal with the issue outside of the
webcasting arena, but one thing is clear: change is right around the comer.
STUART M. MAXEY
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